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Abstract 
 
Methods have increasingly been placed at the heart of theoretical and empirical 
research in IR and social sciences more generally. This article explores the role of 
methods in International Relations and argues that methods can be part of a critical 
project if reconceptualised away from neutral techniques of organising empirical 
material and research design. It proposes a two-pronged reconceptualisation of critical 
methods as devices which enact worlds and acts which disrupt particular worlds. 
Developing this conceptualisation allows us to foreground questions of knowledge 
and politics as stakes of method and methodology rather than exclusively of ontology, 
epistemology or theory. It also allows us to move away from the dominance of 
scientificity (and its weaker versions of systematicity and rigour) to understand 
methods as less pure, less formal, messier and more experimental, carrying 
substantive political visions. 
 
Keywords: Methodology, critical international relations, scientificity, STS, 
intertextuality, ethnography 
 
 
Introduction 
 
What does it mean to approach the discipline of International Relations through 
methods and methodology? What effects does methodology have on the critical and 
political questions asked by the discipline, how does it shape the modes of inquiry 
undertaken by students of IR and what relation does it bear with critical approaches in 
                                                
1 The article is an outcome of work we did within the International Collaboratory on Critical Methods 
in Security Studies (ICCM), an ESRC funded International Networking and Training Opportunities 
project (ESRC RES-810-21-0072). We would like to thank the members of the ICCM, the participants 
in the ICCM workshops, the journal editors and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on 
earlier versions of this article. 
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the discipline? Methods have increasingly been placed at the heart of theoretical and 
empirical research in IR and social sciences more generally. Publishers fund 
numerous textbooks on methods, postgraduate students are required to take 
methodology courses (rather than say, theory courses) and funders require long 
statements about method. On the one hand, methods, both qualitative and quantitative, 
are seen to drive research, rigour, systematicity, objectivity and credibility in social 
sciences (e.g. Klotz and Lynch 2007; Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2004; Yanow 
and Schwartz-Shea 2006). On the other, methods have been criticised for their 
disciplining or ‘hygienising’ function, to use John Law’s terminology (2004). The 
substantive political disagreements and the differences in visions of the world that are 
at the heart of debates are seen to be neutralised by discussions on techniques of 
gathering and processing data, the search for shared methods of establishing universal 
truths, and an investment in the idea of the unity of social science. It is perhaps 
therefore not surprising that critical debates in IR have shifted either towards ontology 
or towards epistemology.  Despite other differences, constructivist, poststructuralist, 
feminist and critical realist scholars would largely agree on this move towards 
ontology and/or epistemology contra the disciplining force of method (e.g.Harding 
1989; Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2011; Tickner 1997; Walker 1993; Wendt 
1999; Wight 2006). In this view, methodology can only be rescued when separated 
from the tyranny of method and reframed as an overarching epistemological and 
meta-theoretical reflection. Methodology is thus subsumed within ontology, 
epistemology and theoretical arranging of concepts structuring the discussions, while 
method becomes at best a reflection on the tools for organising empirical material and 
practical research design.  
 The main criticism formulated against method and traditional methodologies 
concerns their instrumentalisation as a ‘guarantee’ for the scientific and 
orderly/ordered research that the discipline aspires to. However, a series of critical IR 
scholars have turned a more attentive eye to methodology and have integrated 
reflections on methodology within critical projects. For instance, Jennifer Milliken’s 
(1999) article on discourse analysis has become a reference text for constructivist and 
poststructuralist approaches. More recently, Lene Hansen (2006) has placed 
methodology firmly at the heart of debates in critical security studies. Intervening in 
the debates about the role of science in IR, Patrick Jackson (2011) foregrounds 
methodology as the main site of reflection. In the wake of a growing interest in 
ethnography, the Review of International Studies recently published a series of articles 
on autoethnography as a critical intervention in IR (Bleiker and Brigg 2010). Debates 
on ethnographic research as a methodology for critical IR have also recently 
proliferated (Gusterson 2008; Rancatore 2010; Vrasti 2008; Wedeen 2010). Similarly, 
constructivists and interpretive approaches have increasingly reclaimed methodology 
away from positivism and ideas of methods as ‘free-floating tools unmoored in 
conceptual space’ (also Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009; Yanow 2006b:  8). Well 
before this renewed focus on criticality and methodology, Hayward Alker (1996) had 
foregrounded methodological questions in his proposal for a humanist approach to IR. 
Method and methodology have also been at the heart of feminist debates – from 
Christine Sylvester’s formulation of ‘empathetic cooperation’ as a feminist method 
for IR (1994b), Cynthia Enloe’s Bananas, Beaches and Bases (1989) to the recent 
edited book by Ackerly, Stern and True on Feminist Methodologies in International 
Relations (2006).  
Taking our cue from some of these reflections on method and the status of 
methodology, we argue that method and methodological reflections can be a key site 
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of revisiting critique and politics in International Relations research. This requires two 
closely interrelated moves. First, methods need to be understood as performative 
rather than representational (Law 2004; Law, Ruppert, and Savage 2011; Law and 
Urry 2004). They are not simply techniques of extracting information from reality and 
aligning it with – or against – bodies of knowledge. Methods are instead within 
worlds and partake in their shaping. As performative, methods are practices through 
which ‘truthful’ worlds are enacted, both in the sense of being acted upon and coming 
into being. This move implies a reversal of the usual order of discussion that 
subsumes method and methodology to debates driven by the formulation of a 
problem-question, an ontology, an epistemology and a conceptual toolbox. The 
concept of method we propose does not treat methods as an outcome of particular 
ontology and epistemology so that a particular method can only be used in relation to 
certain philosophical positions.2 Methods are instead performative practices 
experimentally connecting and assembling fragments of ontology, epistemology, 
theories, techniques and data through which substantive effects are obtained.3 
The second move we make is to conceptualise methods as political rather than 
value neutral. They interfere through enacting substantive, and/or rupturing positions 
on social and political questions. The disciplinary politics of methods is not new for 
critical scholars both in IR and social sciences more broadly. For Dvora Yanow, 
methods are political as they entail contestations among scholars and bring about a 
‘power element in the accreditation of knowledge’ (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006:  
28). Therefore, methods are not instruments for creating common ground but for 
power struggles, competing enactments of worlds and/or creating disruptive positions 
in the worlds of international politics. 
In similar terms to Yanow, John Law has argued that methods partake of  at 
least two ‘goods’: truth and politics (2004:  148-9).4 Rather than subsuming method to 
the single question of science and what counts as scientific and non-scientific, Law 
shifts the understanding of methods and what methods do to the entwined questions of 
truth and politics. While taking our cue from this recasting of method beyond the 
‘science question’, we argue that the politics of method can be understood slightly 
differently if we conceptualise methods as ‘devices’ and ‘acts’. Understood as 
devices, methods are seen to enact social and political worlds. Understood as acts, 
methods can become disruptive of social and political worlds. This dual 
reconceptualisation also allows us to derive an understanding of critical methods. 
 We therefore ask: what happens to critical research in International Relations 
if we insert questions of critical methods and not just critical theory, of substantive 
                                                
2 Compare Colin Wight’s argument that  ‘methodology (…) is a normative exercise, since it 
stipulates that given certain ontological posits, certain methods should be employed rather than 
others.' (2006:  259) 
3 See also e.g.: Alker (1996: 64-103). We do not use systematically as sharp a distinction between 
methodology and method as some other authors do. Yet, at places we do work loosely with the often-
used distinction between method and methodology. Method refers then to the techniques of extracting 
information from an object and methodology to systematic reflections on principles guiding 
investigation and its modes of aligning ontological, epistemological, conception, design and data 
elements. Our conception of method as experimental connection of ontology, epistemology, technique, 
concepts, and data requires us however to avoid using a sharp distinction between the two. The 
distinction is often used to introduce a hierarchy in which methods become the mere expression of 
ontological and epistemological approaches rather than a substantive practice where ontological and 
epistemological choices are constructed. Such a hierarchising of the abstract, the concrete and the tools 
connecting them is what we seek to move away from in our conception of method.  
4 Law’s use of ‘truth’ here is consonant with Michel Foucault’s ‘regimes of knowledge’ rather than the 
universal truths of science. 
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political vision and not just methodological plurality at the heart of our inquiries? 
Starting from this question, we explore what critical projects of IR are possible when 
acknowledging method as a focal point of enquiry; a point of view that is often seen 
to either precisely neutralise political stakes invested in knowledge or to only derive 
those from pre-existing theoretical and ontological investments.5 To this purpose, the 
article proceeds in three steps. First, we revisit some of the texts and debates that have 
placed questions of methodology and method on the IR agenda in critical ways. Given 
some impasses and limitations in this literature, we then move on to our first 
reconceptualisation of methods as ‘devices’ and unpack the knowledge and political 
stakes invested in this concept of method. In a third step, we turn to methods as ‘acts’ 
to draw out different modalities of engaging knowledge and politics critically. We 
conclude with a series of remarks on the implications of this twofold 
reconceptualisation for critical IR research. 
 
A critical methodological ‘turn’? Challenging methods as techniques 
 
The discipline of International Relations has quickly embraced the language of 
‘turns’. For instance, the ‘linguistic’ or ‘rhetorical turn’ (Neumann 2002), the 
‘constructivist turn’ (Checkel 1998), the ‘aesthetic turn’ (Bleiker 2001), the ‘ethical 
turn’ (Frost 1998), the ‘ethnographic turn’ (Vrasti 2008) or the ‘material turn’ 
(Aradau 2010) have functioned both as political projects and forms of academic 
capital (and capitalisation). The list of turns in the discipline could be seriously 
expanded if one were to search the titles and abstracts of articles and books published 
during the past 20 years or so. However, the metaphor of ‘turns’ is also problematic, 
inasmuch as it assumes a clear break between a ‘before’ and ‘after’ as well as 
relatively coherent forms of inquiry (a turn to something else). In a sense, the 
language of ‘turns’ is unhelpful for understanding what goes on in the discipline. Yet, 
for our purposes, inserting critical methodology in the discourse of ‘turns’ can work to 
signify a particular presence-absence of critical method in IR, particularly as different 
‘methodological turns’ have already been formulated in IR.6 
 Methods and methodology are present – even excessively so – in the practices 
of funding research and drawing boundaries between research ‘worth’ doing and 
research which has not been thought out carefully, properly or sufficiently.7 The 
problem with this excessive and dominant presence of methods has been aptly 
captured by Law: 
 
If ‘research methods’ are allowed to claim methodological hegemony or (even 
worse) monopoly, and I think that there are locations where they try to do this, 
then when we are put into relation with such methods we are being placed, 
                                                
5 There are some significant exceptions to this point of view. The so-called second big debate in IR 
between behaviouralist and traditionalist approaches expressed profound political and knowledge 
stakes to a considerable extent in methodological terms. The work of Christine Sylvester, Sandra 
Harding, Cynthia Enloe, Michael C. Williams or Hayward Alker, among others, has shown the 
profound intertwining of methodological choices with political issues. 
6 Hansen (2006) has argued, for instance, for a ‘poststructuralist methodological turn’. 
7 In the UK, the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) has set up, for instance, a national 
research methods centre and funded research methods programmes. According to the ESRC, the 
programme ‘aimed to develop quantitative and qualitative methods within the context of substantive 
research and to promote the effective dissemination of good practice through a range of related training 
activities’ (ESRC n.d.). The motto for the ESRC National Centre for Research Methods is ‘Learn a new 
method’. 
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however rebelliously, in a set of constraining normative blinkers. We are being 
told how we must see and what we must do (Law 2004:  13).8 
 
Contrary to the proliferation of methods as a disciplining and constraining tool, 
critical academic practice has taken up a strategy of distancing from the limits and 
constraints of methodological requirements.9 This has led to a double move: on the 
one hand, the privileging of ontology and on the other of epistemology.  Ole Waever's 
(1996) analysis of the inter-paradigm debates captures this move away from 
methodology towards ontology and epistemology in the third and fourth debate. In 
contrast to the realism/liberalism and behaviourism/traditionalism debates, the third 
debate involved questions about the ontological and epistemological assumptions 
used in different paradigms (realism, liberalism, Marxism). The fourth debate 
(rationalism/reflectivism) has often been represented as one over epistemology, the 
role of science and modes of knowledge-making. For Waever, the fourth debate is 
strongly philosophical; it is about ‘basic assumptions regarding objectivity, 
subjectivity (the author, signature and the work), object/subject distinctions, the use of 
dichotomies, the rule of Western metaphysics over seemingly diverse ways of 
thought, and about referential versus relational conceptions of language, and much, 
much more’ (Waever 1996:  156-7). In the separation that he draws about how 
questions of politics, philosophy, epistemology and methodology surface in one or 
other of the four debates, methodology is related to the second debate 
(behaviourism/traditionalism) and only secondarily to the third debate. Debates are 
analysed in terms of the primacy of one of these elements. Method and methodology 
have the tendency to be pushed to the background and associated with earlier debates. 
Moreover, the taxonomy also enacts an implicit separation between methodology and 
politics. Particularly in post-positivist approaches, ‘methods’ appear increasingly 
tainted by the allegation of ‘positivism’, ‘naturalism’ and ‘empiricism’. Therefore, a 
methodological inquiry can be seen as inherently suspect for a critical approach. 
Methods appear suspect, as if they were somehow both less critical (when not 
uncritical) and less political. 
 Ken Booth’s (2007) redefinition of constructivism as method is perhaps 
exemplary in these implicit or explicit accusatory practices. If ontology and 
epistemology are to be privileged – and politics is ensuing out of the ontological 
assumptions about the world – methods are ‘less than political’. In Theory of World 
Security, Booth opposes ‘theory’ to ‘method’ and deems constructivism to be of the 
latter category: 
 
First, contrary to many assumptions, social constructivism is not a theory of 
international relations. It tells us nothing about politics among nations in the 
way that realism, for example, does, with its categorical realities of states, 
power, anarchy, and strategy. Constructivism is a method, or meta-theory, about 
the way human society (including international relations) works. (Booth 2007:  
152 emphasis in original).  
 
By being just a ‘method’, constructivism is doubly relegated to the non- or a-political 
– it is unable to be political inasmuch as it doesn’t oppose a ‘theory’ to dominant 
theories and it is non-political inasmuch as it cannot lead to contestation. According to 
                                                
8 See also Anne Norton (2004) and William Connolly (2004) on similar arguments about the role of 
method in political science. 
9 See, however, Alker (1996) and Sylvester (1994a, 1994b). 
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Booth, constructivism as just a method ‘is no more use politically than the political 
assumptions that underlie it’ (Booth 2007:  468).10 Ironically, Booth accuses 
constructivism of exactly what constructivists have tried to hold at a distance – being 
just a method of research. 
 Given the assumption of methods as ultimately disciplining, many critical 
IR theorists have privileged ontology and epistemology (see e.g.Walker 1993) as 
political at the expense of methodology11. Yet, one could also read Booth’s claims 
against the grain and reformulate the accusation addressed to constructivism into a 
question about how methods can be understood as practices of problematising and 
intervening in the world. This also implies that methods can garner critical and 
political weight in ways that had so far only been reserved for theory, ontology and 
epistemology.  
 More recently, several interventions in IR have attempted to claim method and 
methodology (respectively) away from accusatory practices and as an integral element 
of critical projects. The reasons for the foregrounding of methodology are as varied as 
they are numerous. For Vincent Pouliot (2007), the stakes for methodological 
specification are in the communication between different constructivist approaches 
which otherwise have incompatible ontological and epistemological assumptions. For 
Friederichs and Kratochwil (2009:  710), the issue is to produce useful knowledge on 
the basis of a pragmatic methodology that understands scientific inquiry as ‘taking 
place in communities of practice’. Jackson (2011) locates the stakes of  
methodological debates in the scientificity of IR as a discipline. For Ackerly, Stern 
and True (2006:  x), what counts is the ‘methodological rigour that could make a 
difference to the world we live in’. Lene Hansen’s book on security as practice 
(Hansen 2006:  4) also reclaims rigour by arguing that a non-causal epistemology is 
not contradictory to ‘theoretically rigorous frameworks, empirical analyses of “real 
world relevance”, or systematic assessments of data and methodology’. These 
analyses place methodology within critical theoretical projects by enacting a subtle 
secondary distinction between method and methodology. 
 Jackson’s reflections on the conduct of inquiry in IR and Hansen’s 
methodological reflections on foreign policy debates are in this sense particularly 
interesting for our purposes. Like others before him, Jackson sharply distinguishes 
between ‘method’ and ‘methodology’: ‘methods are techniques for gathering and 
analysing bits of data, whereas methodology is “a concern with the logical structure 
and procedure of scientific enquiry” (Sartori 1970, 1,033)’ (Jackson 2011). Method 
continues to serve an accusatory function as it works as ‘mere technique’, largely 
unaware of (or indifferent to) the philosophy of science which Jackson advocates in 
methodological reflection. His remarks on the instrumental role of the philosophy of 
science in this distinction are worth quoting at length: 
 
Philosophy of science is not going to teach anyone how to run a multivariate 
regression testing hypotheses about democracy and economic growth, or how to 
craft an ethnographic account of the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
but it can help us think through the decision to utilize those methods, and make 
sure that we are using research methods in ways that complement one another or 
generally hang together […] Indeed, absent at least a broad agreement on 
strategic questions about the character and status of knowledge, it is unlikely 
                                                
10 Method as an accusatory language is widely used in critical IR: e.g. Milliken (1999). 
11 Hence the call in IR for ‘decolonizing methodology’ (Smith 2006). 
 7 
that the tactical debates about how best to achieve those strategic goals could 
even take place (Jackson 2011:  25). 
 
For Jackson, thinking IR through methodology is a matter of discussing the 
scientificity of knowledge. His politics is that of knowledge production in the 
discipline under the claims of systematicity, ontological compatibility and coherence.  
Jackson’s main argument is that there are different models of scientific knowledge 
that are incompatible with one another but each with their own rigorous criteria for 
evaluating the scientific quality of knowledge.12  Although Jackson proposes 
methodology to become a focal point of debate in IR where ontology, epistemology, 
research design and data gathering can meet, he refocuses the debate immediately 
onto the ontological and epistemological by privileging methodology so thoroughly 
over method. Method is an instrumental matter of bridging the gap between 
theoretical representations of the world and the world itself, and methodology is 
firmly set on the terrain of meta-theory.   
 This distinction between method and methodology allows for critical inquiry 
to be located in the methodological debates (philosophy of science). For instance, 
Colin Wight’s redescription of methodology is illuminating for the high stakes that 
the distinction carries: ‘methodology refers to the critical examination and evaluation 
of research procedures and techniques (methods) as to their ability to provide us with 
more or less reliable knowledge for the research problem at hand’ (Wight 2006:  271 
emphasis ours). Criticality is immediately connected with the interest in methodology 
at the expense of method.  
 While Jackson, Pouliot, and Wight attempt to pluralise methodologies in IR 
research, the overarching commitment to scientificity is not without problems. Firstly, 
as noted by feminist scholars, there are ‘unseen androcentric or masculine biases in 
the way that knowledge has traditionally been constructed in all the disciplines’ 
(Tickner 2006). Moreover, the  ‘rational exemplar of proper science’ (Sylvester 
1994a:  316) effects a whole series of separations and exclusions, relegating women to 
the realm of the non-scientific. However, feminist methodological research does not 
entirely jettison ideas of scientificity. Rather, in recent engagements with 
methodology, it recasts the criteria of rigour, systematicity and objectivity from a 
feminist perspective. In our reading, rigour and systematicity are the most often 
endorsed characteristics of methodological writings in feminist and poststructuralist 
work (see for instance Ackerly, Stern, and True 2006; Alker 1996; Hansen 2006). In a 
fascinating piece on rigour and objectivity, Yanow (2006a) reclaims these 
philosophical concepts from their  restricted meaning in methodology textbooks in 
order to show that interpretive work can be both rigorous and scientific. A shift takes 
place that allows a loosening of the grip of methods as techniques, without breaking 
free nonetheless.  
 Developing post-positivist methodologies and countering the idea that 
different approaches can ultimately come together around shared methodologies is 
                                                
12 This argument is similar to Wight’s discussion of methodology and method in relation to agency-
structure debates in IR (Wight 2006:  257-271) and the one formulated by Pouliot from within 
constructivist debates. Pouliot draws on Ian Hacking’s notion of ‘styles of reasoning’ to capture 
different modes of scientificity – each style of reasoning has a particular object and creates its own 
modes of truth and the verification of the true and false. However, although Hacking has identified six 
such styles of reasoning: axiomatic, experimental, analogical, taxonomical, statistical and historical 
(Hacking 2004), the exact number of scientific styles of reasoning has been debated, thus raising 
questions about the limits of scientific plurality. 
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especially critical in institutional contexts where methodological arguments are used 
to create a hegemonic vision of scientific international studies. Yet, important as this 
argument is in certain academic contexts, for us the critical moves of these 
contributions lie elsewhere. More specifically, this literature foregrounds debates on 
methodology as a central point of entry into studying international politics, thereby 
turning attention to what usually remains at best secondary. Moreover, it indicates that 
methodology is a question of thinking together epistemology, ontology, theory and 
empirical developments rather than simply doing epistemology or mediating the gap 
between theory and empirics. Finally, Jackson in particular inserts an interest in 
unpacking conceptions of worlds that are embedded in methodological thought, 
thereby challenging Booth’s understanding that methodology does not deliver 
substantive visions of world politics and thus neutralises the possibility for critical 
knowledge. As Sylvester and Tickner remind us, methods are not only critical stakes 
in the discipline and social science knowledge more widely but they are also political 
stakes. To use Mary Hawkesworth’s (2006:  48) particularly apt formulation, methods 
do not ‘only construe the political world differently, but also act subtly to promote 
specific modes of political life’. 
 These moves set the parameters for a critical methodological turn that 
indeed can carry the meta-theoretical debates of the 1980s and 1990s – the fourth 
debate – into a new terrain and create a significant opening for a much closer relation 
between claims of criticality, politicality and method. Yet, in some sense this 
literature also limits the promise of the project. By making ‘scientificity’ or a version 
of rigour or systematicity the stake or interest that defines methodological debates, it 
privileges epistemological debates in the philosophy of science and combines them 
with an ontological argument about logically incompatible worldviews that are 
invested in epistemological differences. At least equally limiting is the stark 
separation between method and methodology in most of the literature, thereby 
relegating methods to the dustbin of history (i.e. to that what is not really making 
history and is not part of the world). Somehow formulating a methodological turn in 
which methods are at best a secondary or derivative concern doesn’t feel like it has 
pursued critique all the way. 
 We would like to argue that a critical methodological turn needs to make the 
extra step to tackle these two limitations. First, rather than marginalising methods, we 
seek to reinforce critical projects by returning methods to the heart of methodology 
and thereby avoiding the ‘philosophical fetishization of distinctions’ between method 
and methodology (Harding 1987:  25). Of course, this will require a particular 
understanding of ‘method’ that makes it a ground for the experimental connecting and 
assembling of ontology, epistemology, methodology and worlds. Second, and 
simultaneously, we argue that it is important to turn the interest in a critical 
methodological ‘turn’ from scientific modalities of knowledge only to political stakes 
too. A critical methodological turn is invested in a reconceptualisation of methods 
which makes apparent both knowledge and political stakes. It is in this sense that we 
can speak of critical methods. To this purpose, we reconceptualise methods as 
‘devices’ and ‘acts’. The next section turns to the first aspect of this 
reconceptualisation. 
 
Methods as devices  
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While methods have largely functioned as techniques linking empirical worlds with 
worlds of theoretical abstraction in as undistorted ways as possible, methods 
understood as devices are performative, they enact social and political worlds.13 In 
this sense,  methods ‘have effects; they make differences; they enact realities; and 
they can help to bring into being what they also discover’ (Law and Urry 2004:  393). 
They are devices that interfere in the worlds in which they are deployed. Methods are 
not techniques of representation that simply extract information from externally given 
worlds while leaving the worlds they represent untouched. The device of extraction 
enacts worlds in the sense that it is an active force that is part of a process of 
continuous production and reproduction of relations, an endless process of bringing 
worlds into being. For example, some forms of geographical mapping are a practice 
of creating the world as a global whole and geopolitical entity. The colour-coding, 
line drawing, and naming are crucial elements of the mapping that brings the 
geopolitical world into being.14 Visualisation methods, for example, enact particular 
worlds both in relation to the ‘war on terror’ and climate change. The scientific 
visualisation and modelling of climate change has ‘actively secured the production of 
political responses’ (Yusoff 2009:  1010). Data mining methods deployed to govern 
terrorism also enact futures as unexpected, catastrophic, worst case scenarios 
(Amoore 2009; Aradau and Van Munster 2011). Similarly statistical analyses of the 
relation between migration and crime sustain the criminalisation of migration, 
irrespective of the conclusion of the analysis, by interrogating migration through the 
lens of crime. Mike Savage’s fascinating inquiry into the effects of social science 
methods in Britain in the 1950s and 1960s brings out the role these had in the 
emergence of a ‘modern, rational nation which was amenable to intervention and 
‘management’, and which depended on defining a homogeneous nation, with clear 
geographical boundaries, made up of specific groups’(Savage 2010). 
Treating methods as performative devices is in some sense quite obvious, 
especially when illustrating it by how specific methods, like mapping, visualisation, 
data mining or statistics function in social and political worlds. Yet, it also has a 
surprising edge to it, as it opens up the possibility to understand methods not as an 
application of meta-theoretical and theoretical visions or neutral mediation between 
these visions and reality but as part of the repertoire of devices where knowledge 
exists and is created in action rather than representation. The concept of ‘inscription 
device’ is used in STS (Science and Technology Studies) to bring into focus how 
knowledge production does not take place exclusively in discussions about the 
meaning and significance of inscriptions produced in books, the statistical tables, 
scans, etc. but also in the workings of the inscription devices themselves, or in other 
words, in the material production of the inscriptions. According to Law, an inscription 
device is a system (often including, though not reducible to, a machine) for producing 
inscriptions, or traces, out of materials that take other forms (Law 2004:  20). The 
map is not exactly the same as the water, air, soil or states that are being mapped. 
Neither do statistical numbers reproduce the thick social contexts in which crime and 
migration take place. 
Inscription devices can be graphs, dictionaries, diagrams, machines or 
narrative forms that, in Latour’s words, ‘draw things together’ (Latour 1990). The 
critical methodological turn we are interested in is not just a turn towards 
                                                
13 We have preferred the terminology of ‘devices’ as it has informed the rethinking of methods in 
science and technology studies and has allowed to devise a different vocabulary for conceptualising 
methods. A similar move could also be made by reinterpreting ‘techniques’ in a Foucauldian way. 
14 See for example John Agnew’s (1998) analysis of the modern geopolitical imagination. 
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methodology – the logos of method – but a foregrounding of methods as material 
devices that enact worlds. In a recent book that approaches methods in a material and 
performative way, devices are seen to act as a ‘hinge[s] between concepts and 
practice, epistemology and ontology, the virtual and the actual’ (Lury and Wakeford 
2012:  9). These can be devices used by doctors, scientists, market analysts, 
diplomats, IR scholars, counter-insurgency experts, and so on. For example, network 
analysis is used by security professionals as well as by critical security analysts and 
IR scholars (Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery 2009; Ressler 2006); statistical 
clustering is used in Bourdieuean field research as well as in intelligence work 
(Robson and Sanders 2009). As devices, methods enact social and political worlds in 
multiple ways – the world of terrorism is different when accounted for by mapping 
global inequalities rather than by mapping terrorist networks.  
We use the concept of enactment instead of ‘construction’ or ‘constitution’ to 
keep the fragility of the entities thus made in focus. ‘Construction’ and ‘constitution’ 
tend to emphasise stabilisation. The notion of ‘enactment’ has been introduced in 
methodological literature ‘to allow objects and subjects to change over time, enable 
their identity to be fragile, and allow them to differ from site to site’ (Ruppert 2011:  
223). This understanding of methods makes it impossible to treat methods as simply a 
matter of bringing theory in contact with reality, contemplation with factuality; 
representation with that what they represent. Rather, they make and remake worlds, 
identities, and things in a fragile, continuously changing way.  
The consequences for how we understand method are significant. In most of 
the literature the concepts of method and methodology mobilise a demand for rigour, 
systematicity, scientificity, or generalisability. ‘Method’ names the practice in which 
the messy production of traces is moved to the background so that the inscriptions can 
unproblematically stand in for the reality they are referring to. In that sense, methods 
are a tool not only of the production of representations but also of rendering these 
representations hygienic – taking away the dirt, the material production and 
selectivity, that sticks to the traces so that the inscriptions into graphs, papers, 
narratives, diagrams, etc. can be taken as standing in for reality (Law 2004). This is 
the idea of methods as techniques which leads many IR theorists to separate methods 
from methodology and to consider methods as mere application of a pre-given set of 
tools where nothing really exciting happens. Yet, inscription devices render these 
distinctions messier by including interpretations of how methods enact realities by 
excluding some and forgetting others. (Law 2004) Excluded realities differ from 
forgotten ones in the sense that they remain recognisable within the methodological 
practice despite not being turned into data. For example, using statistical analysis to 
identify social patterns often excludes the worlds of individual experiences and the 
lives that are lived but deviate significantly from the pattern. The lives that are lived 
differently, for example a group of the poor doing and consuming high culture but too 
small to be statistically significant, remain outside of the traces that are produced but 
can remain present as that was is kept outside. Some other realities are not counted in 
the sense of simply not being considered; they exist as forgotten worlds, worlds the 
method erases from the enactment of patterns of cultural consumption and level of 
income. In that sense, methods are substantive in their effects. 
 Taking methods as devices does not imply that ontology, epistemology and 
theory are secondary. Rather our argument is that methods are devices that 
experimentally connect and assemble ontology, epistemology, theory, and worlds by 
putting them into knowledge generating action. In other words, to foreground 
methods is not a move to reverse the priority of methodology over method but rather 
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to emphasise the effects methods have. The central point is to see methods as devices 
of connecting and assembling, as well as the effects this obtains in the social and 
political worlds in which methods operate. The connecting is an experimental, messy 
and possibly failing process of assembling. 
 To illustrate how methods as devices allow us to understand the enactment 
work that methods do through connecting and assembling, we look at how Hansen has 
developed intertextuality as a method for foreign policy and security analysis, 
drawing on poststructuralist insights.  For Hansen,  
 
Understanding foreign policy texts as intertextually linked across a variety of 
media and genres calls for empirical analysis of how these links are made as 
well as for thoroughly theorizing the way in which texts build authority and 
their capacity to speak about a particular issues (Hansen 2006:  55).  
 
Intertextuality implies a particular understanding of what texts are and how they 
generate meaning. In line with the linguistic turn, the texts perform or constitute 
foreign policy and identity through reference to other texts. Foreign policy is 
performed in links between texts across genres.  These texts gain authority and obtain 
capacity to speak policy partly by being interwoven with other texts. Intertextuality is 
the methodological core in Hansen’s work, which moves smoothly from meta-
theoretical reflections about post-structuralism and theoretical reflections about 
international politics over translating these reflections into models of analysis 
followed by research design and concluding with an analysis of debates on the 
Bosnian war. Although these different steps are presented as moving from the 
philosophically more substantive and general to practicalities of research, they are 
connected and work together.  
 In our reading the important choices are not just made in the discussion of 
post-structuralism and theorisation of identity in foreign policy. Intertextuality can be 
seen to function as an inscription device that draws together a series of 
things/documents and orders them in particular ways. To illustrate this, let’s look at 
the instructions on selecting texts. The first is that ‘a majority of texts should be taken 
from the time under study’ but historical texts that relate to them should also be 
included (Hansen 2006:  82).  A second instruction states that key texts are those 
which are ‘frequently quoted and function as nodes within the intertextual debate’ 
(Hansen 2006:  82). At first sight this reads simply like a piece of sound advice. Why 
would one take a piece of text that is not really referred to or why would one collect a 
set of texts randomly from an archive? Yet, something more substantive is implicated 
in these selection criteria. By emphasising representativeness of a particular time and 
assigning significance on grounds of relative quantity of being referenced, 
intertextuality selects and processes texts in a quite specific way. The selection 
criteria have an impact on how meaning is inscribed on the archive and the texts it 
contains.  Intertextuality is used as a device fixing identities. In addition, it introduces 
extra-textual references to the archive to discriminate between the authoritative 
capacities of texts. Although the analysis is extended to unusual genres of texts like 
travel writing, Hansen also instructs that one should definitely include governmental 
texts as the starting point since one is studying foreign policy.  
 In a project interested in political identity construction this may sound quite 
obvious. Yet, the care that is taken in instructing quite precisely how to action 
intertextuality arises partly, we suspect, from the possibility to action it differently. In 
particular, Hansen’s intertextual inscription device differs from the actioning of 
 12 
intertextuality by Kristeva (1980, 1986). Kristeva focuses on demonstrating the 
inherent instability or contingency of meaning; intertextuality is a deconstructive 
rather than identification device. For her, the world is in the first instance inside the 
text and not connected to institutional sources and political contestation. The 
intertextual references are mobilised to show how meaning within a text is necessarily 
unstable and by implication how fixing meaning requires a strategy of constructing 
and reproducing a particular set of interpretations, be it one that never fully succeeds 
given that meaning is inherently instable. Rather than fixing meaning, intertextuality 
creates uncertainty about what the text is actually saying; it critiques the naturalising 
power of texts, the taken for granted nature of meaning. The representativeness of a 
text on grounds of the number of quotations and the institutional source of the text is 
not crucial. Any text can be used to analyse the non-foundational nature of meaning. 
The two intertextualities are not unrelated – Hansen also draws on Kristeva, and more 
generally on poststructuralist philosophy, and has an interest in de-naturalising 
meaning. Yet, there are two different devices at stake that connect similar meta-
theories, theories, and worlds differently in the actioning of discourse analysis. 
 Understanding methods as connecting and assembling of ontology, 
epistemology, concept development, techniques of data gathering and worlds – rather 
than simply being the expression of ontological and epistemological choices – is an 
important step.  At the same time, something else is implied. If methods are an active 
practice of bringing these various elements in relation rather than being simply the 
expression of an alignment that is cascaded down from ontology and epistemology 
over theory and concept building to methods, then methods must be experimental in 
their work of connecting and assembling. Philosophical coherence between the 
various elements is less important than tentative and explorative assembling of 
ontological and epistemological perspectives as well as data and concept fragments in 
relation to a research question or set of issues that drive the development of 
knowledge, such as the securitisation of migration, the transformation of geopolitics,  
the rise of risk governance, the prevention of human trafficking, regulation of free 
movement and so on. The concept of device that we propose is therefore probing and 
messy rather than logically and procedurally strict. This performative conception of 
method makes the interferences methods make central to their evaluation rather than 
the logical systematicity of their alignments (see also the illustration taken from 
feminist work in next section). It changes the principles guiding scientific research 
from rigour and systematicity to experimentation and bricolage. In some sense this 
understanding of methodology is self-evident because this is how scientific practice 
often works despite the systematicity and logicality in which they are presented.  
(Latour 1999)  Yet, making this understanding of method explicit can free research 
practice from constraints that the demand of systematic alignment poses and 
encourage more intense and explicit experimental combinations and inventions. 
(Rabinow 2003)  
 This understanding of research activity differs from what Wight and 
Jackson, for example, propose. For us method is performative, fragmented, and 
incomplete but also disruptive. (The disruptive aspect will be developed in the next 
section). Both Wight’s prioritising of ontology and Jackson's classification of 
methodology in philosophical ideal types propose a vision of closed, coherent 
‘systems of knowledge’, which function as a normative benchmark against which one 
can measure the nature and quality of research in light of their ontological and 
epistemological position. For us, methods are always also a practice of experimenting 
with scripted procedures and of transgressing boundaries. Its messiness is a positive 
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rather than discrediting quality. Is our method then one of 'anything goes'? In some 
sense it is, but in a sociological sense it is not. Research activities take place in 
communities, dialogue, struggle, etc. They are the places were seriousness is 
sanctioned but also reconfigured. Importantly, these communities, conversations, 
struggles are not only academic. They include political actors imposing criteria, 
researchers using webtools, citizen scientists, etc.  
 This understanding of methods implies that Jackson’s argument for letting a 
plurality of methodologies co-exist misses something important. Arguing for 
pluralism is an important move in the academic context, of which we are supportive, 
but it does not bring into focus the politicality of the choices within the pluralist 
canvas. The field of a thousand blooming methodological flowers is also a field of 
contestation and struggle, and not simply about what is the best way to do science, but 
also about what subjectivities and worlds are being brought forward in the enactment 
of methods. Once one accepts that methods enact worlds, the question of methods 
necessarily is a question of conflicting, competing, diverse ‘conceptions’ of worlds 
and subjectivities – a question of both knowledge and politics. As Law, Ruppert and 
Savage (2011:  12) have put it, this means that ‘[w]e’re also trading in politics, in 
questions about the kinds of social worlds and subjectivities we want to help make 
more real – to realise – in and through our methods’.  
 Method as device allows us to turn a critical eye to the deployment of 
methods, be those positivist or post-positivist, quantitative or qualitative. Firstly, we 
can make visible the visions of the world that methods enact. For instance, John 
Law’s work on survey as a method used in Eurobarometer reports makes clear that the 
survey, among others, ‘enacts the EU as a neoliberal political site; performs Europe as 
an isomorphic population of individuals in a homogenous bounded, conceptual space; 
reproduces statistics and survey research as reliable tools for describing and so 
enacting social reality, and naturalizes a philosophical romantic version of the 
collective’ (Law 2009:  249). Secondly, the messiness of methods means that we can 
destabilise connections and instituted methodological conventions Finally, we can 
also create different connections within these processes of assembling. Counter-
mapping is a well-known example of experimenting with method in ways that enact 
worlds differently.15 
  At this point the question of critical knowledge becomes inevitably 
connected to a methodological turn. Criticality is about the limits of knowledge but 
also about the substantive worlds that are enacted through the production of 
knowledge. In the next section, we seek to capture the political possibilities it gives 
rise to by interpreting  methods as acts rather than enacting devices, as we have done 
so far. 
 
 
Methods as acts 
 
The second of the two interrelated moves we make for the reconceptualisation of 
methods interprets methods as acts. As the previous section has shown, methods enact 
particular worlds and they work as knowledge in these worlds. Yet, methods as 
devices enact worlds in fragile ways that only become temporarily stabilised. At times 
devices fail, at other times they succeed in enacting particular worlds, in formulating 
                                                
15 See the counter-mapping project led by students at Queen Mary’s university in London, which 
renders visible the role of the university within wider circuits of power and knowledge: 
http://www.culturalstudiesassociation.org/lateral/issue1/countermapping.html. 
 14 
truthful knowledge and intervening politically by shaping the world, be it in minute 
ways. Methods as devices carry particular modes of criticality – alternative 
knowledge is possible by making explicit the implicit definition of a world – and 
politicality – enactments imply struggles over given social arrangements and 
interferences in these arrangements.  
By enacting particular worlds and simultaneously making others less visible or 
invisible, methods as devices partake of and act upon regimes of knowledge and 
politics. We have already mentioned the role of social network analysis and its 
increased popularity both with security experts and sociologists. Another debate has 
recently focused on the role of ethnographic methods and the regimentation of 
anthropological knowledge for the purposes of counterinsurgency operations (see e.g. 
Gusterson 2007). Ethnographic methods have been mobilised in the production of and 
struggles over particular arrangements based on privileged access to local conditions 
and populations. At the same time, these claims to knowledge raise political questions 
about the relations between anthropologists and security experts for instance, between 
researchers and subjects, as well as about the political effects of the ethnographic 
methods one adopts. In response to the politics of ethnographic methods in 
counterinsurgency operation in the ‘war on terror’, anthropologists have tightened the 
ethics of research and have passed their methods through renewed critical scrutiny.16 
However, if the call for critical scrutiny of ethnographic practices and ‘engaged 
anthropology’ has focused largely on the ethics of research rather than ethnographic 
method, our conceptualisation of methods places the criticality and politicality firmly 
at the centre of debates about methods. It is thus not only a question of ethical or 
unethical deployments of ethnographic method, but also a question of the politics of 
ethnography as method.  
If methods enact particular worlds, their experimental connecting and 
assembling can also create ruptures in these worlds. To render these disruptive effects 
that methods can have, we refer to methods as ‘acts’. To stay with ethnographic 
methods, which have gained increased attention in IR, the centrality of politics was 
made visible in a debate opened by Loic Wacquant’s (2002) accusations against urban 
ethnography in the US that it played into the neoliberal ideology of ‘welfare reform’. 
In a review of three ethnographic books which documented the lives of the urban 
poor, Wacquant argues that their authors adopted categories of popular perception as 
analytical categories, romanticised and moralised the poor and thereby played the 
ideological game of neoliberalism with its emphasis on individual responsibility, 
morality of labour and ‘values’. Ethnographic methods appeared enmeshed with 
neoliberal policing of the poor and the state’s ‘carceral-assistential complex’  
(Wacquant 2002). Against this ‘naïve’ ethnography, Wacquant proposes a Bourdieu-
inspired sociological method which is attentive to historical forces, embodied 
agencies and dispositions as well as class and race relations. Yet, proposing a 
structural method of analysis is not really a ‘safeguard’ against incorporation by 
governmental rationalities and practices, as structural methods can also be seen as 
connected with the rise of the Fordist welfare state in the 1960s and 1970s (see 
Clough 2010). Wacquant’s engagement with method can nonetheless be read as an 
attempt to reformulate method as disruptive and political. 
The understanding of methods as devices draws the analysis to the question of 
how methods enact worlds, both as being part of social and political practice and as 
                                                
16 See for instance Jeffrey Sluka’s (2010) reply to an article published in Military Review asking for a 
closer relationship between anthropologists and the military. A series of other articles on this topic 
have been published in Anthropology Today: Fluehr-Lobban (2008), Gonzalez (2007), Albro (2010). 
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creating worlds, such as populations (Hacking 2007) and communities of insecurity 
(Huysmans 2006). Our conceptualisation of methods as acts introduces another aspect 
to the criticality and politicality of methods. Methods as acts can be understood in a 
stronger sense as disrupting worlds. In reconceptualising methods not just as devices 
but also acts, we draw inspiration from the distinction that Engin Isin has drawn 
between acts and ‘habitus, practice, conduct, discipline and routine as ordered and 
ordering qualities of how humans conduct themselves’ (Isin 2008:  27). In everyday 
language, acts refer to what is done as well as the process or practice of doing. An act 
is performative just like a device. This is the sense in which ‘speech acts’ have been 
used. At the same time, an act allows us to place more emphasis on disruptive 
outcomes than performativeness and enactment imply. Unlike the emphasis on order 
and ordering practices in much of social science, acts emphasise rupture and 
disruption.17 Jef Huysmans has recently put forth this disruptive understanding of acts 
as a way of reopening debates about the effects of security practice. In his 
formulation, an act entails ‘the creating of a rupturing scene itself, irrespective of its 
acceptance and institutionalization’ (2011:  373). Thus, methods as acts offer a 
different lens on the production of knowledge and political struggles than methods as 
devices. Understood in this sense, critical methods do not only rupture knowledge, but 
also have the capacity to effect political rupture.  
 In keeping with the focus on ethnographic methods in this section, let us turn 
to one recent debate on ethnographic method in IR which can shed further light on the 
second reconceptualisation we propose here. Ethnographic methods have become 
increasingly popular in IR, with some noting an ‘ethnographic turn’. Yet, Wanda 
Vrasti (2008) has castigated some of this literature for its failure to take account of the 
debates in critical anthropology. Cynthia Enloe’s work is singled out – alongside 
other feminist, constructivist and poststructuralist work – for being simply an 
‘ethnofeel’ (Vrasti 2008:  288) rather than the supposedly ‘authentic’ ethnography of 
critical anthropology.18 The main accusation brought to Enloe’s work is that women’s 
voices are not ‘alive enough’ and the ‘textual stylisation’ is not open to ‘a multiplicity 
of voices, modes of life and political strategies’ (Vrasti 2008). However, as 
Wacquant’s criticism makes clear, a debate about ethnographic method cannot focus 
on the narrative and textual form, but also needs to analyse its political effects. 
 Irrespective of whether Enloe’s work should indeed be understood as 
ethnographic,19 Vrasti’s criticism raises a more general issue about the triangulation 
of method, knowledge and politics. By implying that there is a proper, or more 
adequate and authentic way of doing ethnography, she locates the significance of the 
ethnographic method in its form. The credibility of ethnographic knowledge and the 
solidity of its truth claims would be, in the first instance, a result of the proper 
application of an ethnographic form of research. However, Enloe’s textual method, 
including its ‘ethnofeel,’ rests on the substance it brings to bear on knowledge and the 
                                                
17 Isin’s concept of ‘act’ differs from agency, action, or practice. It refers in particular to practice that is 
rupturing instituted scripts and thus is not reproductive of given structures, institutions, dispositions. 
(Isin 2008) In constructionist work on acts and agency the terms are more ambivalently used as both 
reproductive and transformative (e.g. Giddens 1993). For a more extensive exposition of how the 
concept of act can be used in this disruptive sense in analyses of European citizenship and mobility, 
see: Aradau, Huysmans and Squire (2010); Andrijasevic, Aradau, Huysmans and Squire (2012).   
18 In his reply, Rancatore (2010) rightly makes the point that Vrasti opposes an unspecified but 
‘authentic’ ethnography to the ‘lesser’ ethnography of IR. 
19 Bananas, Beaches and Bases, Maneuvers and the essays collected in The Curious Feminist do not 
necessarily make use of ethnographic methods and Enloe is clear about the importance of texts in her 
analysis. 
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world. Worlds are not enacted through the method form but through the substantive 
positioning that the method contains. Enloe’s work is, not unlike Haraway’s call for 
situated knowledge20, driven by a method that takes a position in the world – in her 
case, the practice of women. She develops ‘feminist curiosity’ as ‘a crucial tool to use 
today in making sense of the links between two of the world’s most potent trends: 
globalization and militarization’ (Enloe 2004:  1-2). ‘Feminist curiosity’ does not fit a 
pre-given tool, nor does it express a particular feminist technique.21 Rather, feminist 
curiosity can be seen as an experimental assemblage that Enloe has developed in her 
work. For Enloe, feminist curiosity simultaneously extracts information from and 
disrupts worlds where globalisation and militarisation meet. Questioning the 
conditions of women turns some things that are taken for granted such as the category 
of ‘cheap labour’ into issues of struggle.  
For us, Enloe’s methods cannot be reduced to disciplinary politics of proper 
theory and method. Enloe uses the language of ‘political acts’ and ‘political action’ 
repeatedly in her works. For instance, in Globalization and Militarism: Feminists 
make the link, she points out that 
 
Developing a ‘curiosity’ involves exploring, questioning—refusing to take 
something for granted. One is not curious about the things one takes for 
granted. […] Developing a new kind of curiosity is not just academic. It takes 
energy. It is political. It is cultural. It is personal. To insist upon posing 
questions about things that other people take for granted can be a political act 
(Enloe 2007). 
  
Her methods, we argue, need to be taken seriously as acts which have disruptive 
political effects. Feminist curiosity is deployed in academic discipline as well as 
international organisations and companies. When deployed, it disrupts these worlds, 
for example by enacting feminism in academia or by challenging the gender neutrality 
of the use of ‘cheap labour’ in international labour relations. When ‘feminist 
curiosity’ is deployed by labour organisations, the enactment of the worlds of cheap 
labour will be different from when ‘cheap labour’ is enacted through gender-neutral 
econometrics or programmes of workers’ rights. In doing so, methods already carry a 
world within them, and not simply forms of doing research.22 
For Enloe, feminist theory does not subsume method. Method is also not 
simply derived from feminist theory. Rather, feminist curiosity is an act that 
experiments with concepts, empirical sites, connects devices in imaginative ways with 
the purpose of disrupting dominant forms of knowledge and practice. Enloe’s 
methods are inseparable from her claim at the end of Bananas, Beaches and Bases 
that ‘the personal is international’. Read backwards and forwards – the personal is 
international and the international is personal – this claim is a goal, an orientation 
about making women visible as much as about understanding why and how the 
international takes the form it does. Read backwards and forwards, this is also a claim 
about knowledge and a claim about politics. In this sense, Enloe’s work does the 
opposite that some ethnographic work has done, as pointed out by Wacquant. The 
                                                
20 ‘… only partial perspective promises objective vision.’ (Haraway 1988:  583) 
21 Feminist writers have often used a combination or modified versions of feminist methods (DeVault 
1996; Harding 1989). However, we relax here the distinction between method and methodology, 
following DeVault’s insight that the method of the feminist movement had been ‘consciousness 
raising’ (1996:  30). 
22 For a similar point on social sciences more generally: Herborth (2011).  
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ordering that methods imply is not a matter of simply interfering in textual 
establishment and reproduction of ‘truth’ – i.e. the representation of worlds – but also 
an attempt at political rupture, both in the academic politics of knowledge production 
and in confrontations between hierarchically organised worlds that exist 
simultaneously in practice – e.g. the company as existing in the world of female 
labour and in the world of the stock market.23 What is important about Enloe’s 
methods is not primarily the form of ethnographic research or even that of 
intertextuality. Like Hansen, Enloe works with a variety of texts. However, the 
orientation of feminist curiosity experimentally assembles various elements of 
method, theory, ontology and epistemology in such ways that they produce a political 
rupture. Feminist curiosity compels Enloe to reject a whole series of ungendered 
terms through which international politics works: ‘“military spouses”, “child 
soldiers”, “factory managers,” “sweatshop workers,” “humanitarian aid workers,” 
“rape survivors,” “peace activists,” “warlords,” “occupation authorities”’ as showing 
an absence of curiosity about women and men and their places/placements in 
international politics (Enloe 2004). Moreover, Enloe argues that if institutions were to 
practice a method of feminist curiosity, the worlds they currently enact would be 
disrupted and different worlds would have to be enacted. What matters is the 
substantive disruption that methods produce and not whether Enloe’s methods are 
ethnographically ‘pure’ or simply have an ‘ethnofeel’. 
  In developing a conceptualisation of methods as acts, we do not suggest that 
all methods are or should be thought as rupturing. Our proposal is that all methods are 
devices that are both in and of the world and that produce truth as well as politics. 
Yet, as acts, methods can do something quite specific. They disrupt particular 
scripted, ordered enactments of worlds. The specific politicality of methods as acts 
does not depend on their form, for example whether being qualitative or quantitative, 
and neither on an ontological vision that all knowledge is political because it 
represents partial worlds. Rather, methods as acts are political by bringing forth an 
orientation informed by subordinate positions that ruptures the ordered and orderly 
worlds (see alsoAndrijasevic 2013). In other words, the notion of act takes us beyond 
an ontological politics that follows from the vision that methods circulate in the world 
and enact the world in this circulation. For the latter, the notion of method-as-device 
suffices. It includes the idea that methods interfere in worlds, both by making claims 
about the knowledge of the world and its politics. In this way, methods as devices also 
carry an idea of politics as making visible alternative worlds. However, such a 
conceptualisation does not focus on the rupturing quality of methods favouring 
positional visions of unexpected, subordinated, forgotten, marginalised events, 
subjects, and things. The latter is central to method-as-act and defines its different 
politics.  
 As devices and acts, methods are fragile and fragmented. They are not 
systematic wholes, like a particular statistical method, a pure ethnography holistically 
incorporating all the changes and contestation within ethnographic history, a 
systematised discourse analysis that demands coherence and strict application. 
Devices can fail and stabilisation is not a straightforward process. Methods as acts 
often borrow and combine bits and pieces from here and there, and try out new 
                                                
23 At this point, it is also worth recalling Paul Rabinow’s cautionary note, addressed to anthropologists 
in the 1980s, that ‘[m]aking textual production the guiding metaphor of the anthropological encounter 
risks serious distortion’ (Rabinow 1985:  6). The politics of method is about something else than form. 
Rabinow is also wary of the ‘equation of avant-garde experiments in form with progressive politics’ 
(Rabinow 1985). 
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combinations to produce a rupturing effect. As instances shifting instituted worlds 
they are fragile, in the sense of being often heavily contested by those looking for 
method as that what provides credibility through its form and consistency as well as in 
the sense of not always producing the rupture they seek. It is in their fragility, 
fragmentation, situatedness and experimentation that methods can become acts. They 
can intervene and disrupt given worlds by creating fragile objectivities from taking 
position in favour of subjugated knowledge, subjects and objects. Thus understood, 
methods have more in common with the etymological meaning of method, understood 
as the pursuit of a goal rather than a set of tools and procedures that are deemed 
scientific (Toulmin 2003). 
  
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has proposed a twofold reconceptualisation of methods as critical – 
methods as devices and acts – to counter-pose the dominance of method as technique 
in International Relations and social sciences more widely. Taking its cue from 
debates about method and methodology in IR which have tried to reclaim method for 
critical approaches, it has argued that methods themselves can be critical if 
understood as experimentally connecting and assembling ontology, theory, and 
epistemology.  
 Method cannot thus be simply derived from theory, ontology and 
epistemology. In a first step, we have argued that methods are both connecting and 
inscribing devices. They enact worlds and make particular orderings more visible than 
others. Drawing on Lene Hansen’s work on intertextuality as method, we have shown 
how actioning intertextuality differently enacts different worlds. Hansen’s actioning 
of intertextuality is different from Kristeva’s for instance. In this interpretation, 
distinctions based on the form of methods – such as qualitative versus quantitative, 
case study versus survey, autoethnography versus mapping opportunity structures – 
are subordinated to the substantive inscriptions they produce. At the same time, 
methods and method work are often significantly messier than methodology – i.e. sets 
of principles against which proper investigation is evaluated – allows for. For Latour 
and Law for instance, devices are various tools in the laboratory that perform their 
own operations but also exist within relatively complex networks of other devices, 
inscriptions, and people which make the inscription activities quite messy  
 Our second reconceptualisation of method focused on acts rather than devices. 
If devices enact worlds, we have argued that the concept of act can make sense of the 
disruptive effects that methods can have. We have drawn on Cynthia Enloe’s method 
of feminist curiosity to illustrate methods as acts. Feminist curiosity allows Enloe to 
disrupt ordered and orderly understandings of international politics by taking 
seriously women’s life. In our view, understanding methods as acts which disrupt 
taken-for-granted knowledge and social and political practice allows us to read 
Enloe’s method as substantive intervention rather than proper form or procedure. In 
that sense, feminist curiosity as method is not about the form of ethnography, 
intertextuality, interview or discourse analysis. Rather, it is about the substantive 
effects that the method as act produces. Methods as devices and acts carry, we have 
argued, particular visions of politics and critique. 
The twofold reconceptualisation of methods proposed here departs from how 
methods have been understood in (critical) international relations on three accounts. 
Placing methods in relation to claims to knowledge and politics prevents the debate 
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on methods to give priority to scientificity and the philosophy of science. Rather than 
methods as ‘meta-theory’, we presented method as an enactment of and rupture into 
the worlds of knowledge and politics. In so doing, our reconceptualisation has shifted 
from a focus on philosophical assumptions to a focus on political effects. In this 
double configuration as devices and acts, methods appear messy and fragile, rather 
than delivering the kind of rigour, scientificity, objectivity, or truth that are the basis 
for the authority of knowledge in many of the methodological debates. Rather than 
type-casting methods as delivering a rigorous or objective knowledge contained 
within a particular epistemology and ontology, the interesting methodological 
question is what it means and what is at stake in proposing fragile objectivity or 
messy truth.24  
Our reconceptualisation of method is not driven by the distinction between 
quantitative and qualitative methods. For methods as devices and acts, it is not a 
question of whether statistical analysis, surveys, network analysis or ethnography is 
used or not. Neither is the ‘purity’ of a method important. For us, methodological 
debates are about the substantive worlds enacted through the method and the potential 
rupture that its enactment creates. This understanding invites eclectic and 
experimental processes of connecting and assembling.  Finally, methods as devices 
and acts do not endorse the plurality of methods as coexistence through indifference. 
Starting with methods as devices and acts brings out the political stakes that methods 
carry and thus the struggles over the worlds that methods enact. 
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